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Abstract
Following the Hatﬁeld accident in October 2000, the cost of running Britain’s railways has
increased very sharply, leading to considerable debate about whether current cost levels are
reasonable. This paper seeks to inform this debate by assessing post-Hatﬁeld cost and TFP
levels against the historical precedents set by British Rail and the early experience of the
newly privatised industry. The results show that industry cash costs rose by 47 per cent
between 1999/2000, the last ﬁnancial year before Hatﬁeld, and 2001/2002 — but,
surprisingly, with train operating costs accounting for 42 per cent of this growth. The
results also show that the post-Hatﬁeld cost spike is unprecedented when compared
against historical benchmarks. Analysis of long-term data on quality and safety measures
indicates that an excessive focus on rail safety may oﬀer part of the explanation for the
cost growth.
Date of receipt of ﬁnal manuscript: August 2004
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1.0 Introduction
The privatisation of British Rail has been the source of much controversy
over the eight years of private sector ownership since 1997. Although Pollitt
and Smith (2002) point to some early successes — in the form of signiﬁcant
operating cost savings — the picture has changed markedly since the
Hatﬁeld derailment in October 2000. This accident led to a reappraisal of
the level of maintenance and renewal activity required to sustain the
network, and resulted in a sharp increase in infrastructure costs. However,
while attention has focused on infrastructure, the data presented in Section
5 of this paper shows that train operator (TOC) costs have also been on
the rise in recent years. Taken together, the data show that (annual) total
industry cash spend increased by £2.9bn (47 per cent) in real terms between
1999/00 and 2001/02.
The post-Hatﬁeld rise in industry costs poses a major ﬁnancial challenge
for the government, and in turn raises the following question: how can
policy makers determine whether post-Hatﬁeld cost and productivity
levels are reasonable, and whether increased funding to the railways
should be permitted? The Oﬃce of Rail Regulator (ORR) has recently
completed (December 2003) a review of the ﬁnances of Britain’s rail infra-
structure provider, Network Rail (2002/03 InterimReview).1 As part of this
review the ORR commissioned a range of studies aimed at answering this
question in respect of infrastructure costs. In particular, internal bench-
marking proved to be a useful approach in deﬁning the scope for Network
Rail to reduce costs by eliminating intra-company cost diﬀerences (see
Kennedy and Smith, 2004; and LEK, 2003).
However, a key diﬃculty for the ORR has been the lack of external
benchmark information against which to make objective and conclusive
judgements about Network Rail’s productivity levels, based on hard evi-
dence concerning best practice achieved elsewhere. Quantitative comparisons
with international operators have proved illusive due to lack of comparable
data, while comparisons with other privatised industries only provide
information about productivity trends; and not levels (see Section 2 for a
fuller discussion of these studies). On the train operation side, the SRA
has carried out TOC-on-TOC comparisons, but we are not aware of any
comparisons with external benchmarks. The government’s dissatisfaction
with the outcome of the 2002/03 Interim Review, and with the lack of cost
1Railtrack owned and operated Britain’s rail infrastructure from April 1994 before being placed into
administration in October 2001. Network Rail subsequently took over from Railtrack in October
2002.
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control in the industry more generally, was one of the key factors behind its
decision to announce a further review of the structure of railways in January
2004.
Of course, the question raised above—whether post-Hatﬁeld cost levels
are reasonable — leads to a second and important question: what is the
cost, at the total industry level, of running Britain’s railways in the post-
Hatﬁeld environment? Following industry restructuring, with the creation
of approaching a hundred new companies, answering this question turns
out to be non-trivial. The diﬃculties are compounded during the period
after the Hatﬁeld accident as a result of large increases in intra-industry
transfer payments (between Railtrack and the TOCs; and between TOCs
and customers and the SRA), which potentially frustrate attempts to
obtain measures of true underlying costs.
The purpose of this paper is to address both the questions outlined
above. First, of all, total rail industry costs are constructed from the
relevant company data over the post-privatisation period. The post-
privatisation period is deﬁned here as 1993/94 to 2001/02 (see Section 4).
Second, post-Hatﬁeld (2000/01 to 2001/02) cost and total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) levels are judged against historical precedents set both by
British Rail and also the early experience of the newly privatised industry
(1963 to 1999/00). Analysis is presented at the total industry level, due
to the considerable problems of splitting out infrastructure costs under
British Rail. TFP measures are derived by estimating a total cost function,
using Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated (SURE) method, and the
econometric results are complemented by analysis based on simple unit
cost measures and Tornqvist TFP indices. In order to ensure comparability
over time, a cash-based measure of total costs is used in the analysis (see
Section 2).
Of course, in recent years both Railtrack and Network Rail have
pointed to the fact that much of the existing track was installed during
the 1970s, thus creating the need for a substantial increase in track renewal
activity (both now and in the future).2 Both companies have therefore
argued for increased funding to pay for this investment ‘bow-wave’,
noting also that the problem has been exacerbated by extended periods
of under-investment during the British Rail era. It has also been argued
(by the ORR and others) that investment was insuﬃcient during the
early years after privatisation (although Railtrack was not funded for a
rise in track renewal activity at vesting).
2These arguments were made during the 2000 Periodic Review and during the 2002/03 Interim Review.
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The impact of the investment cycle, and lagged eﬀects relating from
previous under-investment, causes some problems for assessing productiv-
ity trends over time. Traditional productivity measures relate inputs to ﬁnal
outputs (for example, train km). However, variations in intermediate
outputs, such as the volume of track renewals, will impact on costs3 without
necessarily aﬀecting ﬁnal outputs, and might therefore distort productivity
measures. This point is particularly relevant in the present context since
track renewal volumes have increased substantially since the Hatﬁeld
accident and therefore would be expected to explain part of the recent
cost rises.4
This paper addresses the issue ﬁrst by considering productivity trends in
a long-term context (1963 to date). This approach enables post-Hatﬁeld
productivity performance to be benchmarked against periods with similar
levels of track renewal activity (such as the 1970s). Second, the annual
volume of track renewals is explicitly added to the cost function speciﬁca-
tion in order to test the extent to which the investment cycle impacts on
productivity trends, particularly over the post-Hatﬁeld period. The paper
also examines changes in key quality and safety measures over the period
(punctuality, broken rails, and passenger fatalities), and asks whether
changes in these variables can explain movements in cost and productivity
levels.
Previous academic studies have not addressed the questions raised in
this paper. First of all, the time period considered exceeds those attempted
elsewhere. Earlier contributions do not extend beyond Hatﬁeld, with most
stopping at privatisation. Second, many previous studies have been based
on physical input measures, such as length of track for infrastructure
capital, therefore missing the point of the current debate, which is con-
cerned with track investment and asset condition. Third, those studies
using cost-based input measures have used data that are heavily distorted
by changes in accounting policy over the BR period. These data problems
have not previously been noted in the literature (see Section 2 for further
details). Finally, previous studies have not considered the impact of track
renewals and quality measures on costs and productivity levels.
3This is not just a problem for cash-based measures of total costs. Between 1975 and 1991/92 most track
renewal costs were charged to operating costs. As a result, ﬂuctuations in track renewal volumes also
impact on previous studies using alternative cost measures (i.e. operating costs; or total costs, deﬁned
as operating costs plus accounting depreciation). Even productivity analysis based on ‘physical’ mea-
sures are aﬀected by this issue, since they usually include ‘other material costs’ as an input (alongside
staﬀ numbers and fuel consumption), where other costs include track renewal costs, at least for the
period 1975 to 2001/02. See Section 2 for further details.
4Although there is a separate question as to whether current renewal volumes are at the ‘correct’
level.
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The paper is arranged in six sections. Sections 2 and 3 review the litera-
ture and outline the methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Finally,
Section 5 presents the results, while Section 6 oﬀers some conclusions.
2.0 Literature Review
The relevant literature can be broadly divided into studies commissioned as
part of the regulatory review processes (2000 Periodic Review and 2002/03
Interim Review), and academic contributions. The 2000 Periodic Review
studies were described in Kennedy and Smith (2004). This section brieﬂy
describes the studies carried out during the 2002/03 Interim Review, as
well as the academic contributions that are relevant to the assessment of
productivity and eﬃciency performance on Britain’s railways.
As noted in the introduction, the ORR has so far struggled to establish
clear external benchmarks against which to assess Network Rail’s produc-
tivity levels. This problem ﬁrst became apparent during the 2000 Periodic
Review (see Kennedy and Smith, 2004). More recently, during the 2002/
03 Interim Review, the ORR made some progress in developing inter-
national comparisons (see Halcrow, TTCI, and LEK, 2003). However,
this study produced only limited quantitative results, being based on
identifying areas of best practice for a subset of activities, and for a small
sample of companies.
The ORR also commissioned a number of other external benchmarking
studies during the Interim Review. The OXERA (2003a) study bench-
marked some of Network Rail’s non-core business processes (for example,
HR, Finance) against external comparators. However, their analysis dealt
with only around £200m of Network Rail’s cost base and did not consider
the company’s core operations. Accenture (2003) sought to benchmark
Network Rail’s maintenance and renewal contracting processes against
international best practice. However, the conclusions of this study were
based on subjective judgements about the possible savings from achieving
best practice in this area, expressed in terms of a fairly generic set of prin-
ciples, and not on input–output comparisons with similar rail maintenance/
renewal contracts elsewhere.
Of course, analysis of productivity trends in other industries did not
shed any light on Network Rail’s relative productivity levels (see
OXERA, 2003b). On the train operation side, to our knowledge, the
SRA has not reported international comparisons of TOC costs. To our
knowledge, neither the SRA or ORR has commissioned original analysis
of costs under British Rail.
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In the academic literature there have been a number of studies con-
cerned with measuring productivity and eﬃciency levels/trends on Britain’s
railways, either over time, or as part of broader international comparisons.
These contributions are listed in Tables 1 and 2.
As is clear from the tables, the choice of outputs is broadly the same
across the diﬀerent studies.5 The key features relevant to the present discus-
sion are the choice of inputs and the time period covered. The studies listed
in Tables 1 and 2 can therefore be divided broadly into two types: those that
are based on physical measures of inputs (such as employee numbers;
network length); and those adopting cost-based input measures (such as
variable or total costs). However, analysis using physical input measures
is inappropriate in the present context, since the use of network length to
measure infrastructure capital misses the point of the current debate,
which is concerned with track investment and condition. Cost-based mea-
sures are therefore more relevant in the present context.
Table 1
Summary of ‘Britain-only’ Rail Productivity/Eﬃciency Studies
Study Sample Inputs used Outputs used
Bishop and
Thompson
(1992)
1970–1990
British Rail
Number of employees
Other materials
Capital (PIM-based)a
Passenger km
Freight (net) tonne km
Loaded wagons
Aﬀuso, Angeriz,
and Pollitt
(2002)
1996/97 to 1999/00
25 TOCs
Number of employees
Labour costs
Other costs (excl. track)
Number of rolling stocks
Passenger train km
Passenger km
Punctuality index
Safety index
Cowie (2002)b 1972–1998/99; British
Rail and 25 TOCs
Number of employees
Tractive rolling stock
Track kilometres
Total train km
Pollitt and
Smith (2002)
1988/89 to 1999/00
Privatised industry
Operating costs (excluding
depreciation)
Passenger train km
Freight tonne km
Kennedy and
Smith (2004)
1995/96 to 2001/02
Seven Railtrack zones
Maintenance and track
renewal costs
Quality measures
Passenger train km
Freight tonne km
Track km
aPerpetual inventory method. See Christensen and Jorgenson (1969).
bCowie recognises the lack of direct comparability between the TOCs (train operation only) and
BR.
5The main diﬀerences concern whether ‘available outputs’ (train kilometres) or ‘revenue outputs’ (tonne
kilometres) are used, whether passenger and freight variables are considered separately, or added
together, and whether track or route length is included as an output. In the analysis that follows, alter-
native models are presented, with total train kilometres included as the single output, and then together
with track kilometres. As noted below, the results are little aﬀected if passenger and freight train
kilometres (or passenger and freight tonne kilometres) are used as separate outputs.
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Table 2
Summary of British Rail Productivity/Eﬃciency Studies based on
International Comparisons
Study Sample Inputs used Outputs used
Nash (1985) 1971 and 1981
Europe
Number of employees Total train km, weighted
and unweighted
Deprins and Simar
(1989)
1970–1983
Europeþ Japan
Number of employees
Number of coaches/
wagons
Energy consumption
Route kilometres
Total train km
Gathon and
Perelman (1992)
1961–1988
Europe
Number of employees Passenger train km
Freight train km
Route km
Nash and Preston
(1994)
1980 and 1990
Europe
Number of employees Total train km
Oum and Yu
(1994)
1978–1989
OECD
Number of employees
Energy consumption
Number of rolling stocks
Way and structures capital
(PIM-based)
Passenger km
Passenger train km
Freight tonne km
Freight train km
Gathon and
Pestieau (1995)
1961–1988
Europe
Number of employees
Number of rolling stocks
Route kilometres
Sum of passenger tonne km
and freight tonne km
Cowie and
Riddington (1996)
1992
Europe
Number of employees
Capital (ﬁnancial measure)
Passenger train km
Service provision index
Preston (1996) 1977–1990
Europe
Variable costs (excludes
capital costs)
Passenger train km
Freight train km
Route km
Passenger km
Freight tonne km
Andrikopoulos
and Loizides
(1998)
1969–1993
Europe
Total cost. Includes capital
costs (historic cost
depreciationþ interest)
Sum of passenger km and
freight tonne km
Cantos, Pastor,
and Serrano (1999)
1970–1995
Europe
Number of employees
Energy/materials costs
Number of rolling stocks
Track kilometres
Passenger km
Freight tonne km
Coelli and
Perelman (1999
and 2000)
1988–1983
Europe
Number of employees
Rolling stock capacity
Route kilometres
Passenger km
Freight tonne km
Tsionas and
Christopolous
(1999)
1969–1992
Europe
Number of employees
Energy consumption
Capital (ﬁnancial measure)
Sum of passenger km and
freight tonne km
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The cost-based studies listed in the two tables have been carried out
using either variable or total costs to measure inputs. However, changes
in accounting policy during the British Rail period mean that it is
inappropriate to consider variable costs in isolation. In particular, the
accounting treatment of track investment changed twice between 1975
and 1992. From 1975 track investment (except major projects) was
funded through the P&L each year (previously it was capitalised).6 From
1991/92, the policy was changed again, with all track investment subse-
quently capitalised. The results of previous studies based on variable cost
measures are therefore likely to be signiﬁcantly distorted (the change in
1991/92 saw operating costs fall by about 10 per cent). To our knowledge,
this point has not been noted previously in the literature.7
Table 2
Continued
Study Sample Inputs used Outputs used
Cantos, Pastor,
and Serrano (2000)
1970–1995
Europe
Number of employees
Energy consumption
Materials consumption
Number of locomotives
Number of passenger and
freight carriages/cars
Track kilometres
Passenger km
Passenger train km
Freight tonne km
Freight train km
Christopolous,
Loizides, and
Tsionas (2000)
1969–1992
Europe
Total cost. Includes capital
costs (historic cost
depreciationþ interest)
Total train km
Sanchez and
Villarroya (2000)
1970–1990
Europe
Variable cost (excludes
capital cost)
Passenger train km
Freight train km
Cantos and
Maudos (2001)
1970–1990
Europe
Operating costs Passenger km
Freight tonne km
Cantos, Pastor,
and Serrano (2002)
1970–1995
Europe
Operating costs
Track kilometres
Passenger km
Freight tonne km
Loizides and
Tsionas (2002)
1969–1992
Europe
Operating costs
Capital stock (ﬁnancial
measure)
Passenger km
Freight tonne km
6It was charged to the proﬁt and loss account as depreciation over the life of the asset.
7Such changes will also aﬀect the computation of capital stock based on the perpetual inventory
method, as in Bishop and Thompson (1992), since large elements of investment were simply expensed
each year for signiﬁcant periods of time. Furthermore, this change will also impact on the analysis of
total costs including depreciation, since in the year of change, operating costs will change by more than
the corresponding change in depreciation.
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Some studies (Andrikopoulos and Loizides, 1998; Christopolous et al.,
2000) have conducted analysis of British Rail productivity based on total
costs (operating costs plus historic cost depreciation). However, the use
of historic cost depreciation to measure capital costs represents a serious
weakness in an industry with long asset lives, and given the many changes
in accounting policy over the period.8 Furthermore, the problems are
compounded by inaccuracies in the UIC9 depreciation data used in the
studies. In the case of Britain, capital grants are (incorrectly) included in
the depreciation charge reported by the UIC, which distorts the data
by plus or minus 60 per cent in some years as a result (see Appendix 1).
To our knowledge, this point has not been previously noted in the
literature.10
Finally, it should be noted that of the studies listed in Tables 1 and 2
only one extends beyond the Hatﬁeld accident (Kennedy and Smith,
2004). However, the analysis in the latter study considers productivity
trends for infrastructure maintenance and renewal activity only, and
does not include a comparison with infrastructure costs under British
Rail.11 Of the remaining studies, only three continue the analysis
beyond privatisation — Aﬀuso, Angeriz, and Pollitt (2002); Cowie
(2002); and Pollitt and Smith (2002) — with each stopping short of the
Hatﬁeld accident. This means that rail industry productivity levels and
trends — for the post-Hatﬁeld period — have not yet been reported in
the literature.
Given the above discussion, this paper therefore makes its contribution
ﬁrst by computing total industry costs post-privatisation (and post-
Hatﬁeld), and then by carefully constructing a cost series for the BR
period to enable a robust historical comparison. The analysis is based on
total industry cash costs — operating costs plus capital expenditure — a
measure that is invariant to the changes in accounting policy noted
above. Furthermore, this paper adds to previous approaches by also
considering the impact of ﬂuctuations in annual track renewal activity, as
well changes in key quality and safety measures over the period (punctual-
ity, reliability, broken rails, and passenger fatalities).
8In 1991/92, as noted above; again at privatisation; and more recently in 2001/02. The impact of the
2001/02 change was to reduce Network Rail’s depreciation charge from £1,915 to £316m in the year.
9International Union of Railways.
10Furthermore, all studies based on UIC data (based either on variable or total costs) do not distinguish
between rail and non-rail (such as hotels) costs.
11As noted earlier it is problematic to split BR data accurately between infrastructure and other costs;
and such data was certainly not available by zone for the BR period.
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3.0 Methodology
Three complementary methodologies are used in Section 5 in order to
address the questions raised by this paper. First of all, unit (total cash
cost) measures are computed and compared over the period.
However, since unit cost measures are aﬀected by changes in input
prices (average wages; fuel prices) as well as productivity movements,
Tornqvist indices of total factor productivity are also calculated. The
Tornqvist index is deﬁned as:12
lnðTFPk=TFPlÞ ¼
Xm
i
ðRik þ RilÞ=2 lnðYik=YilÞ

Xn
j
ðSjk þ SjlÞ=2 lnðXjk=XjlÞ; ð1Þ
where k and l are adjacent time periods, the i and j subscripts denote the m
outputs and n inputs, theRs and Ss are the output revenue shares and input
cost shares respectively, and the Ys and Xs are outputs and inputs. Diewert
(1992) notes that the Tornqvist index is preferred to the other indices (such
as the Paasche or Fischer indices) based on its relationship with economic
theory. However, the Tornqvist index requires the assumption of constant
returns to scale13 and is therefore unable to distinguish underlying produc-
tivity changes from productivity movements resulting from scale and/or
density eﬀects.
Econometric analysis is therefore required in order to model scale/
density eﬀects. Econometric estimation also allows the impact of other vari-
ables to be tested (for example, Hatﬁeld eﬀects, and the impact of renewal
volumes on costs).14 The main analysis in this paper, therefore, is based on
the estimation of a total cost function using the translog function originally
proposed by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973). The translog — one
of the so-called ﬂexible functional forms — provides a second-order
approximation to any twice diﬀerentiable cost function. It places no
a priori restrictions on the input elasticities of substitution, and allows
the extent of scale economies to vary across diﬀerent output levels.
12See Christensen and Jorgenson (1970).
13See Diewert (1992), p. 190.
14The latter would be hard to incorporate within a Tornqvist index, as there would be no obvious weight
to attach to the renewals (as an intermediate output), as compared with other ﬁnal outputs.
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The translog cost function may be written as:
LnC ¼ a0 þ
X
i
aiLnYi þ
X
j
bjLnWj þ 1=2
X
i
X
k
dikLnYiLnYk
þ 1=2
X
j
X
m
gjmLnWjLnWm þ
X
i
X
j
rijLnYiLnWj þ yt:T
þ 1=2ytt:T2 þ
X
j
yjtLnWj:T þ
X
i
pitLnYi:T ; ð2Þ
where C is a measure of total costs, Yik are the outputs,Wjm are the inputs,
and T is a time trend representing technological progress.15 Conformity
with theory requires the imposition of symmetry and linear homogeneity
of degree one in input prices. Symmetry requires that:
dik ¼ dki;
gjm ¼ gmj;
i 6¼ k
j 6¼ m ð3Þ
while linear homogeneity requires the following restrictions:
X
j
bj ¼ 1;
X
j
gjm ¼ 0;
X
j
rij ¼ 0;
Xn
j
yjt ¼ 0: ð4Þ
However, instead of using the linear homogeneity restrictions in
equation (4) it is more convenient to impose linear homogeneity by dividing
costs and input prices by one of the input prices (arbitrarily chosen). Note
that prior to imposing linear homogeneity all data is normalised by the
sample means (except the time trend and Hatﬁeld dummy variables).16
For the preferred model shown in Section 5 (Model 2), the normalised
translog can therefore be written as:17
LnðCASH=WMCÞ ¼ a0 þ a1LnTRAC þ a2LnTTM þ b1LnPL þ b2LnPF
þ d111=2ðLnTRACÞ2 þ d221=2ðLnTTMÞ2
þ d12LnTrac:LnTTM þ g111=2ðLnPLÞ2
þ g221=2ðLnPFÞ2 þ g12LnPL:LnPF
þ r11LnTRAC:LnPL þ r12LnTRAC:LnPF
þ r21LnTTM:LnPL þ r22LnTTM:LnPF
þ ytT þ 1=2yttT2 þ y1tLnPL:T þ y2tLnPF :T
þ p1tLnTRAC:T þ p2tLnTTM:T þ yDHAT ; ð5Þ
15Note that some of the time interaction terms are dropped in the ﬁnal estimation — see Section 5.
16That is, the translog approximation to the underlying cost function is taken at the sample mean.
17Note that symmetry has been imposed in equation (5). Note also that not all of the time interaction
terms are included in the ﬁnal estimation — see Section 5.
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where CASH is total cash costs (operating cost plus capital expenditure),
the chosen output measures are TRAC (track kilometres) and TTM
(total train kilometres) respectively (in order to distinguish between
economies of scale and density), WL is the price of labour, WF is the
price of fuel, WMC is the price of materials and capital expenditure
inputs, PL ¼ ðWL=WMCÞ, PF ¼ ðWF=WMCÞ, T represents technological
progress, and HAT is a dummy to take account of Hatﬁeld eﬀects.18
Two alternative speciﬁcations are also reported in the results in Section
5: ﬁrst, excluding the TRAC variable from equation (4) (Model 1); and
second, by adding annual track renewal volumes (RENEW) as an addi-
tional, intermediate output (Model 3); see Figure 2.
To improve the precision of the estimates, the above cost function is
estimated together with the factor share equations derived from Shephard’s
Lemma:
SL ¼ b1 þ g11LnPL þ g12LnPF þ r11LnTRAC þ r21LnTTM þ y1tT
SF ¼ b2 þ g12LnPL þ g22LnPF þ r12LnTRAC þ r22LnTTM þ y2tT ;
ð6Þ
where SL and SF are the labour and fuel cost shares respectively. The above
system of equations is estimated using Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated
(SURE) method; implemented using the statistical package MICROFIT.
Before proceeding, it has been pointed out in the literature that total
cost function estimation may not be appropriate in the railway sector,
since managers may not be able to adjust the level of capital input optimally
(Caves, Christensen, and Swanson, 1981). However, in the present context,
it can be argued that managers are able to control the capital input measure
chosen in this paper — namely the level of annual capital expenditure in a
given year — and therefore that the assumption of total cost minimisation
can be justiﬁed here. Furthermore, the cost impact of diﬀerent network
structures and densities are reﬂected through the inclusion of track kilo-
metres, alongside measures of traﬃc volumes, in the cost function speciﬁca-
tion (following, for example, Friedlaender and Spady, 1981).
Of course, it should be noted that total cost function estimation is
common in empirical studies of railway productivity: see, for example,
Friedlaender and Spady, 1981; Caves, Christensen, Tretheway, and
Windle, 1985;19 Andrikopoulos and Loizides, 1998; Christopolous,
Loizides, and Tsionas, 2000; and NERA, 2000.20
18HAT takes the value 0.5 in 2000/01 (since the Hatﬁeld accident occurred mid-way through 2000/01),
unity in 2001/02 and zero elsewhere.
19The authors note that they also estimated a variable cost function with similar results.
20Report prepared for the ORR during the 2000 Periodic Review (with Tae Oum and Bill Waters II).
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4.0 Data
This section describes the dataset used in the empirical analysis described
below; a summary of the key data is shown in Table 3 (for further details
see Appendix 2).
4.1 Cost information
As noted in the introduction, in this paper the post-privatisation period is
taken to start in 1993/94, the ﬁrst year impacted by the restructuring and
Table 3
Data Summary
Period annual averages
Units Pre-
privatisationa
Post-
privatisation
Post-
privatisation
Pre-Hatﬁeld Post-Hatﬁeld
1963 to
1992/93
1993/94 to
1999/00
2000/01 to
2001/02
Cost data
Total cash cost (CASH) £m realb 6,095 5,633 8,419
Input pricesc
Labour (WL) £ real 16,318 25,200 28,740
Fuel (WF ) £ real 257.7 139.1 139.6
Materials and Capex (WMC) Index
(1963¼ 100)
95.7 89.6 93.0
Final outputs/network size
Total train kilometres (TTM) thousands 405,048 410,560 467,872
Passenger train kilometres (PTM) thousands 335,514 381,463 431,550
Freight tonne kilometres (FTON) million 19,757 15,366 18,750
Track kilometres (TRAC) kilometres 37,193 32,704 32,757
Intermediate outputs
Rail kilometres renewed (RENEW )d number 694 359 990
Quality measures
Broken railse number 745 772 621
Train performancef Per cent on
time
88.1 90.0 81.5
Passenger fatalitiesg number 42 22 16
Notes
a1992/93 is the last year before the impact of privatisation was felt.
bAll ﬁnancial values in 2001/02 prices, based on the RPI.
cLabour price per head; fuel price per tonne oil equivalent.
dSee Figure 2 and associated notes and discussion.
eData series starts in 1969.
fData series starts in 1974. Train performance is a composite measure of the punctuality and
reliability data published by British Rail. See Appendix 2 for further details.
gData starts in 1964.
Sources: see Section 4 and Appendix 2.
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privatisation process (see Pollitt and Smith, 2002). For the pre-privatisation
period (1963 to 1992/93 inclusive), all cost information is taken from the
British Rail Annual Reports. However, as discussed in Section 3, construct-
ing a comparable cost series over the British Rail period requires great care.
Of course, the decision to use a cash-based measure of total costs in this
paper makes this easier. Nevertheless, a number of adjustments and
assumptions have been made and these are brieﬂy outlined below.
Where relevant, operating grants (such as level crossing grants) and capi-
tal grants (such as regional development grants) have been added back to
operating and capital costs in order to construct measures of gross costs.
Non-rail costs, such as those associated with hotels, have been excluded
from the cost base. In addition, in respect of capital costs, non-operational
property capital expenditure is excluded from the analysis. Finally, Channel
Tunnel capital expenditure (completed in 1994/95) is excluded from the
capital cost series in order to obtain comparable investment information
as it relates to the existing network, rather than to new routes.
The post-privatisation period in this paper can be divided into two
sub-periods: the transitional years (1993/94 to 1995/96) and the post-
privatisation period proper (1996/97 to 2001/02). Cost data for the
transition period (1993/94 to 1995/96), before the existence of a full set of
privatised company accounts, are constructed from a combination of
British Rail and Railtrack Annual Reports21 (for 1993/94 and 1994/95),
although cost data for 1995/96 had to be extrapolated.
For the post-privatisation period proper (1996/97 to 2001/02), industry
operating costs are computed as the diﬀerence between total industry
revenue and total industry operating proﬁts, following Pollitt and Smith
(2002).22 Revenue and proﬁt data are readily available from the relevant
company accounts (TOCs, freight operators, rolling stock companies,
and Railtrack). Total industry cash costs can then be derived for this
period by adding the capital expenditures incurred by each element of the
industry.23 Capital expenditure data are available from the relevant
company accounts, supplemented by data provided by Network Rail.
Non-operational (or investment) property capital expenditure is excluded
from the data, as is capital expenditure relating to the Channel Tunnel
Rail Link,24 in line with the treatment of the ﬁrst stage Channel Tunnel
project.
21Note that Railtrack was created as a separate company in 1994/95, but was still owned by the govern-
ment until the end of the ﬁnancial year 1995/96. See Pollitt and Smith (2002) for further details.
22Note that ORR and SRA (non-subsidy) costs are included within the post-privatisation cost base.
23Since intra-industry payments have already been dealt with in arriving at industry operating costs.
24A high speed train link connecting London with the Channel Tunnel.
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It should be noted that the calculation of industry operating costs over
the post-Hatﬁeld period (2000/01 and 2001/02) is further complicated by
the very large intra-industry compensation payments resulting from the
Hatﬁeld accident and the 2000 Periodic Review of Railtrack’s access
charges.25 Detailed analysis was carried out in order to ensure that these
items did not distort the calculation of industry costs, and a number of
adjustments were made where required. This analysis was based on infor-
mation provided in the notes to the company accounts, as well as detailed
access charge revenue data provided by Network Rail. Any assumptions
made have been veriﬁed following discussions with National Express
Group.26 Further details are provided in Appendix 2.
The lack of available proﬁt data for Railtrack’s suppliers27 means that
the approach taken here may overstate post-privatisation costs (to the
extent that these contracts are proﬁtable). However, it is expected that
this lack of data should not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the analysis here. First,
although contractor proﬁt data are not available from the company
accounts, a signiﬁcant element of contractor proﬁts/losses — relating to
the performance regime — is taken into account in the analysis, based on
data from Network Rail. Second, there is no evidence that post-Hatﬁeld
infrastructure cost rises have been driven by increased contractor proﬁt
margins. Indeed, in 2003, one of Network Rail’s contractors, Jarvis,
announced its decision to pull out of maintenance activities altogether28
(this development suggests that the company was not making excessive
proﬁts, and perhaps the reverse).29
Finally, as noted in Pollitt and Smith (2002), any overstatement in costs
due to lack of data on contractor proﬁts will be partially oﬀset by potential
cost understatements resulting from lack of data on minor (open access)
freight operators. Of course, it should also be noted that some activities
25These payments include: (1) performance regime compensation paid by Railtrack to the TOCs (£590m
in 2000/01); (2) TOC penalty payments to the SRA (c. £100m per year); (3) Clause 18.1 payments
made by TOCs to the SRA following the 2000 Periodic Review (£182m in 2001/02); and (4) the
post-Hatﬁeld passenger compensation package paid by train operators (£70m in 2000/01). See
Appendix 2 for further details.
26Finance Director, Trains Division.
27The relevant company accounts do not provide suﬃcient information to derive proﬁts on work carried
out for Railtrack.
28Furthermore, in the zonal eﬃciency analysis presented in Kennedy and Smith (2004), the results show
that the process of renegotiating the vesting maintenance contracts (which took place at diﬀerent times
between 1999 and 2002) had no systematic impact on relative contract payments across the zones.
Once again, this ﬁnding suggests that recent cost increases were not driven by changes in contractor
proﬁtability resulting from the contract re-negotiation process.
29The announcement by Jarvis was followed, shortly afterwards, by Network Rail’s decision to bring all
maintenance activities in-house.
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were also contracted out under British Rail, particularly following the sale
of BREL30 in 1988.
4.2 Input prices and cost share information
Input price information has been derived from a number of sources. For the
pre-privatisation period, the price of labour (WL) is computed as staﬀ costs
divided by staﬀ numbers (in line with the approach used in previous
studies), with the data taken from the British Rail Annual Reports. For
the period after privatisation the price of labour is based on average
salary information for those elements of the industry for which data is
available, namely TOCs, freight operators, rolling stock companies and
Railtrack (and, during the transition period, British Rail).
A fuel price (WF ) index for the period up to 1993/94 is calculated based
on total fuel costs (from British Rail accounts) divided by fuel consumption
in million tonnes of oil equivalent (data provided by the OECD). Since fuel
cost data is not available beyond 1993/94, this price index is extrapolated
forward based on (pre-tax) price data for diesel and electricity prices also
provided by the OECD.31 The approach taken diﬀers from that adopted
in previous studies, where the fuel price index has been calculated based
on fuel costs per train kilometre (see for example, Sanchez and Villarroya,
2000). Note that, in the latter case, movements in fuel costs resulting from
changes in fuel eﬃciency are (incorrectly) counted as price changes.
The price of materials and capital expenditure inputs (PMC) is based on
a relevant price index supplied by the ONS (transport equipment).32 It
should be noted that some previous studies have used materials cost per
train mile to reﬂect materials prices (for example, Sanchez and Villarroya,
2000),33 therefore raising a similar issue to that noted in the previous para-
graph for fuel costs. Cost share information as between staﬀ, fuel and
materials, and capital expenditure for the BR period is taken directly
from the BR Annual Reports. After privatisation, cost shares are based
on the split between operating and capital expenditure costs over the
post-privatisation period.34
30British Rail Engineering Limited (rolling stock production).
31OECD, Energy Prices & Taxes: Quarterly Statistics; and Energy Balances of OECD Countries.
Automotive diesel for commercial/industrial use; electricity for industrial use.
32This is the price index for gross ﬁxed capital formation, and is a combination of indices based on, in
the earlier years: transport and communications; then transport; and ﬁnally transport equipment.
Since the materials and capital expenditure cost data is already deﬂated by the RPI, the materials
price measure is taken to be the ratio of the transport equipment price index to the RPI.
33Other approaches (such as Andrikopoulos and Loizides, 1998) appear to have ignored materials costs
altogether, or else have included them implicitly alongside depreciation within capital costs.
34However, the split of operating costs as between staﬀ, fuel costs and materials is based on the ﬁnal year
under British Rail, due to lack of data on these items post-privatisation.
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4.3 Other data
Data for the outputs and quality measures are taken from a variety of
sources, predominantly the British Rail Annual Reports, National Rail
Trends (SRA) and Transport Statistics Great Britain. In addition, Network
Rail provided data on rail renewal volumes and broken rails. (See Appen-
dix 2 for further details.) The calculation of Tornqvist indices also requires
information on physical input measures, in order to separate out the eﬀects
of input price and productivity changes. For this purpose, equivalent
physical measures for labour, fuel and materials/capital, are derived by
dividing the relevant costs of each element (from the cost share data), by
the input prices.35
5.0 Results
As noted in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the
current debate about rail industry cost and productivity levels in Britain,
by comparing recent experience (since Hatﬁeld, 2000/01 to 2001/02) with
historical precedents under British Rail and during the ﬁrst few years of
the privatised structure (1963 to 1999/00). This section sets out the results
of the analysis, and is divided into three parts. The ﬁrst part (5.1) compares
post-Hatﬁeld cost levels with historical precedents based on simple unit cost
measures. The second part (5.2) contains the main productivity analysis of
the paper, consisting of TFP estimates based on total cost function estima-
tion as well as Tornqvist indices. The impact of changes in track renewal
activity (an intermediate output) on observed productivity measures is
also evaluated.
The ﬁnal part (5.3) uses long-term data on quality and safety measures
(train performance, broken rails, and passenger fatalities) to consider
whether observed productivity trends can be explained by movements in
these important variables (which are usually ignored in productivity analy-
sis). However, attempts to incorporate these measures directly into the total
cost function— outlined in Section 3— did not produce sensible results. As
a result, the analysis in 5.3 is based mainly on simple observation of cost/
quality data over time. In addition, some econometric work is conducted,
aimed at understanding the determinants of quality and safety measures
over the period.
35Physical measures are derived from the cost and input price data, and are therefore not equivalent
to the physical measures used in previous studies — where, for example, the capital input has been
represented by track kilometres.
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5.1 Unit cost trends on Britain’s railway (1963 to 2001/02)
Before considering more complex approaches to productivity measure-
ment, it is worth brieﬂy looking at what has happened to unit costs over
the period in question. Figure 1 shows total industry cash costs per train
kilometre (TTM) between 1963 and 2001/02. In addition, preliminary
estimates of unit costs for 2002/03 and 2003/04 are also provided.36 The
trends in Figure 1 can be described according to a number of distinct
time periods. First, following cost reductions achieved during the large-
scale closure of routes and stations in the 1960s (‘The Beeching era’),37
unit costs started to rise during the 1970s, reaching a peak in 1979. This
growth in cost coincided with a major programme of track renewals, com-
parable with post-Hatﬁeld levels (see Figure 2), as well as rising (real) fuel
and labour prices.
Unit costs then fell steadily during the 1980s, interrupted brieﬂy by a
period of unit cost increases at the start of the 1990s, as the economy
Figure 1
Total Rail Industry Cash Costs per Train Kilometre
36The estimates for the last two years are based on the increases in Network Rail costs since 2001/02,
with other industry costs (passenger and freight operators; rolling stock companies) assumed to be
constant in real terms (since data are not yet fully available beyond 2001/02).
37Richard Beeching (later Lord Beeching) was appointed chairman-designate of the British Railways
Board in 1962 and was responsible for two reports on the state of Britain’s railways (see Beeching,
1963 and 1965).
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moved into recession and traﬃc volumes fell.38 These data are in line with
previous papers reporting strong productivity growth during the 1980s (for
example, Bishop and Thompson, 1992). However, the cost reductions may
also reﬂect the declining volume of track renewals during the period
(discussed in more detail below). With the onset of restructuring and
privatisation — starting in 1993/9439 — unit costs then fell further before
rising sharply between 1999/00 and 2001/02, following the Hatﬁeld
accident. The preliminary estimates for 2002/03 and 2003/04 also indicate
that unit costs have continued to rise since 2001/02.40
Given the scale of cost increases post-Hatﬁeld, it is informative to look
at how these break down between the diﬀerent parts of the privatised indus-
try (see Table 4). Not surprisingly, Table 4 shows that infrastructure costs
have increased considerably since 1999/00. What is surprising, however, is
that TOC costs have also been rising sharply since Hatﬁeld, with TOC cost
rises (including rolling stock costs) accounting for 38 per cent of the total
industry cost increase over the period. Perhaps of more concern, the data
indicates that much of the TOC cost hike has come from rises in the
basic cost of delivering services41 and not simply from higher capital
costs relating to new rolling stock. We are carrying out ongoing work in
38Note that this growth does not reﬂect Channel Tunnel investment, since the latter is excluded from the
cost data (as is investment in the Channel Tunnel Rail Link after privatisation).
391992/93 is the last year unaﬀected by privatisation — see Pollitt and Smith (2002) for further details.
40See note to Figure 1.
41That is, TOC-own operating costs in Table 4.
Table 4
Sources of Post-Hatﬁeld Cost Increases
Rail industry cash costs 1999/00 2001/02 Cost Percentage Percentage
£m, 2001/02 prices Pre-Hatﬁeld Post-Hatﬁeld rise growth of total rise
Infrastructure
Operating costs 1,438 2,049 610 42 21
Capital expenditure 1,748 2,826 1,077 62 37
3,187 4,874 1,688 53 58
Passenger train operation
TOC-own operating costs 1,980 2,491 511 26 18
ROSCO operating costs 278 291 13 5 0
ROSCO/TOC capital expenditure 312 898 586 188 20
2,570 3,680 1,110 43 38
Other, including freight 484 595 110 23 4
Total industry cash costs 6,241 9,149 2,908 47 100
Total costs per train km (£) 13.76 19.32 5.57 40
Sources: see Section 4 and Appendix 2.
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this area, aimed at providing a more comprehensive analysis of post-Hat-
ﬁeld cost drivers.42 For now, it is suﬃcient to note that the data in Table
4 point to the need for close attention to cost trends across the whole indus-
try — and not just infrastructure.
Returning to the long-term, industry-level story, it is clear from Figure 1
that post-Hatﬁeld unit costs (in 2001/02) are much higher than the average
over the period (by 29 per cent) and also substantially higher than the
previous peak during the 1970s (by 17 per cent). These results suggest
that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd precedents for post-Hatﬁeld levels of cost in the
railway industry — based on experience from the last four decades —
even when today’s costs are compared with periods of very high track
renewal activity (for example, the 1970s). Of course, before reading too
much into these ﬁndings, it should be noted that the analysis so far is
based on simple observation of trends in unit costs, and that more advanced
methods are required to make conclusive judgements on relative productiv-
ity levels (Tornqvist and econometric approaches).
5.2 TFP estimates based on total cost function and Tornqvist methods
(1963 to 2001/02)
The aim of this sub-section is further to investigate long-term rail produc-
tivity trends in Britain, using the econometric methodology set out in
Section 3. This method is able to take account of both input price changes
(for example labour/fuel prices) and scale/density eﬀects. The econometric
results are also checked against Tornqvist indices.
As noted in the introduction, Network Rail has recently argued the need
for substantially higher track activity, as track installed in the 1970s comes
up for renewal (see Figure 2), and to address under-investment during the
BR era and immediately after privatisation (renewal volumes have also
been signiﬁcantly impacted by the West Coast Mainline Project).43 It was
also noted that these investment cycle eﬀects potentially hinder attempts
to measure productivity trends accurately over time44 — a point that is
particularly relevant in the present context due to the sharp rise in track
renewal activity since Hatﬁeld. This issue is addressed in the analysis that
follows, by comparing recent costs with earlier periods of signiﬁcant invest-
ment (for example, the track renewal boom in the 1970s, the West Coast
upgrade in the 1960s and 1970s, and the East Coast upgrade in the
1980s); and by explicitly including track renewal volumes as an output
variable in one of the cost function speciﬁcations (see Table 5).
42Clearly staﬀ cost rises play a part, but there remains a large element of unexplained cost rises.
43The renewal and enhancement of Britain’s West Coast Main Line (linking London and Glasgow).
44As noted in the introduction, this is not just a problem for cash-based cost measures.
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It could be argued, of course, that the volume of track renewals is an
intermediate output and not a ﬁnal output, and that we should not be con-
cerned with changes in this variable. As such, increased track renewals
might only be considered valuable to the extent that they translate into
improvements in measures that are valued by users (for example, safety
and performance). Nevertheless, changes in the volume of track renewal
activity will clearly aﬀect cost levels from year to year, and it would there-
fore seem unwise to ignore such eﬀects. Final output (safety and perfor-
mance) measures are considered separately in the next sub-section (5.3).
Before proceeding it should be noted that the data in Table 4 show a
substantial increase in rolling stock capital costs over the period since
Hatﬁeld. To the extent that this investment represents higher volumes of
new rolling stock purchased, relative to any previous time period under
British Rail, this increase could be used partly to justify recent cost
increases.45 Nevertheless, unless the new rolling stock — an intermediate
output — translates into real beneﬁts to customers, for example in
Figure 2
Track Population by Year of Installationa
aThese data are used as a proxy for annual renewal volumes. However, since some of the track laid in the early
years of the sample, for example the 1960s, may now have been replaced, this data series may understate the
true level of renewal volumes during that period. This graph is sourced from Network Rail’s 2003 Business Plan,
though has been supplemented with data on actual track renewal volumes from Railtrack’s Annual Returns for
some of the post-privatisation years.
45However, it has not been possible to obtain equivalent physical measures against which to measure the
volumes and unit cost of new rolling stock purchased in previous years. A consistent time series of
rolling stock investment, for the period of this study, is illusive, since trains were leased by British
Rail during some time periods (though this issue does not aﬀect the comparability of the total industry
cash cost measure).
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improved reliability and comfort (a case that is not yet proven),46 this jus-
tiﬁcation might still be weak. Of course, the rise in rolling stock capital
expenditure represents only about one ﬁfth of the increase in costs over
the period, and the results that follow are not materially aﬀected if this
increase is excluded from the data.47
5.2.1 Presentation of econometric results
Table 5 shows the econometric results for the three speciﬁcations described
in Section 3. The ﬁrst two speciﬁcations (Models 1 and 2) use traditional
46Reliability problems have been experienced by some new rolling stock introduced in recent years.
47The available data on rolling stock investment suggest that the 2001/02 value was unusual compared
with previous time periods (though see footnote 45). The sensitivity referred to in the text therefore
excludes the increase in rolling stock investment between 2000/01 and 2001/02 from the 2001/02
cost base. The results show a small improvement in the post-Hatﬁeld productivity index, though
this change is not suﬃcient to alter the conclusions of the paper.
Table 5
Restricted Seemingly Unrelated Regression (1963 to 2001/02)
Dependent Variable: Ln(Cash/WMC)
Traditional Models Renewals Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Constant 0.3070 0.1784 0.0874
LnTRAC – 1.1214 1.4030
LnTTM 0.9613 0.3483 0.1371
LnPL 0.6637
 0.6694 0.6601
LnPF 0.0357
 0.0283 0.0270
HAT (Hatﬁeld Eﬀect) 0.3324 0.2933 0.2364
T (Time Trend) 0.0147 0.0074 0.0024
1=2ðLnTRACÞ2 – 1.5696 3.0358
1=2ðLnTTMÞ2 4.2463 6.2238 2.8668
1=2ðLnPLÞ2 0.0531 0.1077 0.0959
1=2ðLnPF Þ2 0.0311 0.0338 0.0331
LnTRAC:LnTTM – 3.7352 3.4506
LnTRAC:LnPL – 0.1961 0.2029

LnTRAC:LnPF – 0.0907
 0.0926
LnTTM:LnPL 0.3889 0.4798 0.4926
LnTTM:LnPF 0.0546
 0.0019 0.0018
LnPL:LnPF 0.0401 0.0296 0.0310
LnPL:T 0.0058 0.0058 0.0054
LnPF :T 0.0007
 0.0011 0.0012
RENEW – – 0.0699
R2 statistic 0.8606 0.9312 0.9432
Durbin Watson statistic 0.9258 1.4238 1.626
 ¼ signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level;  ¼ signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.
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measures to represent the outputs of the railway industry, that is, total train
kilometres (TTM)48 and/or track kilometres (TRAC). Models 1 and 2 do
not take account of track renewals directly in the regression, although
the long-time period chosen for the analysis enables productivity levels
and trends to be compared over periods with similar track renewal volumes
(for example the post-Hatﬁeld period vs. the 1970s). Model 3 seeks to
model track renewal volumes explicitly by including the RENEW variable
directly in the regression equation as an additional, intermediate output
(see Figure 2).
For each of the models in Table 5, the translog total cost function is
estimated as a system, together with the factor share equations (see Section
3). Starting with the ﬁrst two (traditional) models, as stated above, railway
outputs are represented by TTM (in Model 1) and by both TTM and
TRAC (in Model 2). The latter speciﬁcation enables the eﬀects of scale
and density to be evaluated separately.49 Note that passenger and freight
outputs are not considered separately in order to reduce the number of
regressors, given the relatively small sample size.50 Note also that some
of the second-order time variables are excluded from the regression equa-
tion (only those that are statistically signiﬁcant are retained).51 Hatﬁeld
eﬀects are modelled through the inclusion of a Hatﬁeld dummy variable
(HAT ; see Section 3).
Models 1 and 2 perform well in terms of the degree of ﬁt, and the signiﬁ-
cance of the variables, with all ﬁrst-order terms and most of the second-
order terms being signiﬁcant. Model 1 suggests broadly constant returns
to scale, while Model 2 indicates economies of density combined with dis-
economies of scale (evaluated at the sample mean). Although previous
studies of the structure of rail costs in Britain are limited in their approach
(as described in Section 2 above), it is worth considering how the scale and
density results in this paper compare with those earlier studies. In the only
previous study to report scale and density economies separately for Britain,
Preston (1996) also found diseconomies of scale alongside economies of
density. The remaining literature provides varying results, with US studies
48Passenger train kilometres plus freight train kilometres.
49Note that TTM and TRAC are not closely correlated, and their inclusion together is therefore unlikely
to cause problems of multicollinearity.
50The inclusion of separate passenger and freight outputs also introduces potential collinearity problems,
and the resulting models do not perform as well in terms of the signiﬁcance of the output variables.
However, these models produce almost identical results in respect of the coeﬃcient on the time
trend andHatﬁeld dummy variables. The use of a single railway outputmeasure is common in previous
studies, for example, Andrikopoulos and Loizides (1998), who used the sum of sum of passenger
kilometres and freight tonne kilometres to reﬂect railway output in a single measure.
51The inclusion of all second-order time variables caused some ﬁrst-order output terms to become
insigniﬁcant.
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suggesting constant returns to scale and increasing returns to density, while
the majority of European studies have found evidence of decreasing returns
to scale in respect of the British network.52
On balance, Model 2 is preferred to Model 1, for a number of reasons.
First, Model 2 is able to distinguish scale and density eﬀects. The ﬁnding of
decreasing returns to scale (alongside increasing returns to density) seems
credible, based on the evidence from previous studies, and the apparently
high cost of expanding capacity.53 Model 2 also performs better in terms
of theR2 andDurbinWatson statistics.While the inclusion of TRACalong-
side the time trend variable might raise some concerns regarding multicolli-
nearity, there is no evidence of any serious eﬀects on the results.54 However,
to reﬂect the diﬀering interpretations oﬀered by the two approaches, the
results of both models are referred to in the discussion that follows.
Turning to the renewals model (Model 3), this speciﬁcation includes the
track renewal variable (RENEW) directly in the cost function as an addi-
tional output, and is identical to Model 2 in all other respects. Note that
the coeﬃcient on the RENEW variable has a positive sign and is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the expected positive relationship between
renewal volumes and costs (note that only the ﬁrst-order term is included
in order to conserve degrees of freedom).55 Model 3 performs well in
terms of ﬁt and signiﬁcance of the variables, although the ﬁrst-order
TTM variable becomes insigniﬁcant with the addition of the RENEW
variable. Note, however, that the RENEW variable is not statistically
signiﬁcant when included in Model 1 (results not shown).
In line with theory, the estimated cost functions in Table 5 are mono-
tonically increasing (since the predicted cost shares are positive), and the
Allen-Uzawa own (partial) elasticities of substitution, evaluated at the
sample means, have the required negative signs (see Table 6).56
52That is, where scale and density eﬀects are not reported separately (and only returns to scale are
reported). See Gathon and Perelman (1992) and Sanchez and Villarroya (2000). On the other hand,
Andrikopolous and Loizides (1998) reported increasing returns to scale for the British network.
53Furthermore, greater than proportional cost reductions resulting from the Beeching cuts (in the 1960s)
may be expected — relative to track mileage — given the very large number of stations closed during
that period.
54All the ﬁrst-order variables are signiﬁcant, and the standard errors are low. Furthermore, the Model 2
results are robust to changes in the sample period.
55The ﬁrst-order renewal variable is positive but insigniﬁcant if all interaction terms are included,
perhaps as a result of the large number of regressors relative to the sample size.
56Global concavity requires the own partial elasticities of substitution to be negative at all points in the
sample (or, more precisely, for the matrix of second-order derivatives of the cost function — the
Hessian — to be negative semi-deﬁnite throughout). The required properties are satisﬁed globally
in respect of labour and capital and materials prices; though they are violated for a handful of data
points in respect of fuel prices. The latter is not considered serious since fuel costs account for less
than 5 per cent of total costs on average.
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5.2.2 Discussion of results
What do the results in Table 5 tell us about comparative productivity levels
and trends over the period in question? Beginning with the traditional
models, Models 1 and 2, the ﬁrst point to note is that the Hatﬁeld
dummy variable is large and strongly signiﬁcant in both models, indicating
a ‘Hatﬁeld eﬀect’ on unit costs of 39 and 34 per cent (Models 1 and 2
respectively),57 or a deterioration in productivity of 28 and 25 per cent
respectively. These ﬁndings are in line with the results reported in Kennedy
and Smith (2004). They suggest that the post-Hatﬁeld cost increases
reported earlier are exceptional when compared with historical precedents,
including periods such as the 1970s, which saw similar levels of track
renewal activity to those observed in recent years.
The coeﬃcients on the time-trend variables also indicate, alongside the
observed Hatﬁeld eﬀects, annual TFP growth of approximately 1.4 and 0.7
per cent (for Models 1 and 2) over the period 1963 to date. The diﬀerence in
time trend between the models is apparently driven by the alternate ﬁndings
on scale eﬀects reported above. Interestingly, it was not possible to identify
a signiﬁcant privatisation eﬀect (in either of the two models) separate from
the Hatﬁeld eﬀect (the coeﬃcient on a privatisation dummy took the
expected negative sign, but was not statistically signiﬁcant).
This latter ﬁnding appears to contrast with the results obtained in Pollitt
and Smith (2002), where substantial reductions in operating costs were
reported for the post-privatisation, pre-Hatﬁeld period, compared with
the counterfactual scenario (although the analysis there was not based on
econometric methods). However, Figure 1 shows that total industry
costs, like operating costs, were lower during the early period after privati-
sation (covering the period from 1993/94, but before 1999/00). The fact that
this eﬀect does not show up as statistically signiﬁcant in the econometric
Table 6
Allen-Uzawa Partial Elasticities of Substitution
(evaluated at the sample mean)
Own elasticities
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Labour input 0.641 0.461 0.500
Fuel input 6.324 5.178 5.466
Materials and capex input 1.491 0.980 1.075
57Calculated as EXP(0.3324) and EXP(0.2933)-1 for the two models.
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results may reﬂect the relatively small number of post-privatisation, pre-
Hatﬁeld data points and the large number of variables included in the
cost function. Of course, the results in Table 7 do show faster TFP
growth after privatisation, although this increase reﬂects a gradual increase
in productivity growth over the sample, rather than a clear privatisation
eﬀect.58
The results from the renewals model (Model 3) are similar to those of
Models 1 and 2, although the magnitudes of the Hatﬁeld eﬀects and time
trends diﬀer (see Table 5), with Model 3 suggesting a much lower time
trend coeﬃcient (which is also statistically insigniﬁcant). This ﬁnding sug-
gests that part of the (time-trend) productivity gains reported in Model 2
can be explained by the decline in track renewal volumes from the mid
1980s onwards. Likewise, the Hatﬁeld eﬀect is smaller than under Model
2 since part of the cost increase post-Hatﬁeld can be explained by increased
renewal volumes over the period. In this case, a privatisation dummy
variable shows up as just signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level (negative
sign), although its inclusion produces some large standard errors and
changes to the other coeﬃcients.
Taking account of Hatﬁeld and time-trend eﬀects, Table 7 compares
post-Hatﬁeld productivity levels for the econometric models (Models 1 to
3) and the Tornqvist approach against four earlier periods. These are:
1963; the previous track renewal boom in the 1970s (represented by
1975);59 the end of the BR period (1992/93);60 and the last year before
Hatﬁeld (1999/00). Not surprisingly, given the diﬀerent coeﬃcients on
58The inclusion of the LnPL:T and LnPF :T terms in the cost function allows the time trend to vary over
the sample.
591975 is not only the mid-point of the 1970s, but also the peak of the 1970s track renewal boom.
601992/93 is the last year unaﬀected by privatisation. See Pollitt and Smith (2002).
Table 7
Total Factor Productivity Indicesa
Econometric Models
Tornqvistb
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Index
Start of sample: 1963 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Previous track renewal peak: 1975 116.2 106.5 100.5 129.7
End of BR era: 1992/93 149.3 120.4 104.4 156.6
Last pre-Hatﬁeld year: 1999/00 168.2 129.1 108.0 188.2
Post-Hatﬁeld: 2001/02 125.0 98.3 86.2 139.8
a1963¼ 100 for all indices.
bSee Section 3 for description of this index. Uses TTM as the single output, to maintain consis-
tency with the other results.
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the time-trend variable (see Table 5), Model 1 indicates signiﬁcantly higher
TFP growth over the period 1963 to 1999/00 than Model 2. Furthermore,
since Model 1 implies broadly constant returns to scale, the Tornqvist pro-
ductivity results are closer to those of Model 1 than Model 2. Appendix 3
shows a comparison of the results with previous studies.61
Based on the preferred model (Model 2), Table 7 shows that the TFP
gains achieved over the period up to the Hatﬁeld accident (1999/00) have
been more than wiped out by post-Hatﬁeld falls; leaving TFP in 2001/02
just below 1963 levels. Model 2 also shows that post-Hatﬁeld productivity
levels are lower than during the last period of major track renewal in
Britain, in the 1970s, by about 8 per cent, and considerably lower than in
the last year of the BR period, by around 18 per cent. Including track
renewals in the regression equation (Model 3) produces the same overall
conclusion (though the magnitudes of the eﬀects diﬀer).
Meanwhile, Model 1 paints a similar story to that of Models 2 and 3,
although the end result is that post-Hatﬁeld TFP levels remain higher
than at the beginning of the sample, putting a slightly more favourable
interpretation on productivity performance post-Hatﬁeld. This ﬁnding is
replicated by the Tornqvist index results. Nevertheless, Model 1 still
suggests that there has been no productivity growth over the last twenty
years, with the implied post-Hatﬁeld TFP performance equivalent to that
achieved as long ago as 1980.62
To sum up, the above results show that the sharp cost increases follow-
ing the Hatﬁeld accident are unprecedented when compared against histor-
ical benchmarks set by British Rail and the early experience of the newly
privatised industry (1963 to date). While railway costs are clearly inﬂuenced
by the investment cycle, including periods of under-investment, the results
show that costs have increased much more steeply over the post-Hatﬁeld
period than during previous investment peaks in the sample (for example,
the track renewal boom in the 1970s).
Taking into account both the Hatﬁeld eﬀects on costs and longer-term
TFP trends, the preferred models in Table 7 (Models 2 and 3) show that
post-Hatﬁeld total factor productivity is now lower than at any time over
the last four decades. These results suggest that it is not possible to
justify post-Hatﬁeld cost and productivity levels by reference to historical
precedents, even when ﬂuctuations in track renewal volumes are taken
into account.63 The ﬁnal part of this section (5.3) considers whether
61Studies that have reported TFP indices for comparable periods. See Appendix 3 for further details.
62And as long ago as 1983 under the Tornqvist approach.
63As noted earlier, this result is not materially aﬀected if the post-Hatﬁeld increase in rolling stock
capital investment is excluded from the cost series.
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improvements in key safety and quality measures can provide part of the
explanation/justiﬁcation for higher costs in the post-Hatﬁeld environment.
However, we ﬁrst take a brief detour to consider the impact of the 2002/03
Interim Review on the above ﬁndings.
5.2.3 Relationship with the 2002/03 Interim Review
The previous analysis has shown that productivity levels deteriorated
sharply following the Hatﬁeld accident and are now (in 2001/02) lower
than at any time over the four decades covered by this paper. The analysis
therefore suggests that the industry should be able to reduce costs/improve
productivity in future years. In this regard, in its 2002/03 Interim Review
conclusions the ORR has recently tasked Network Rail with achieving
eﬃciency savings of between 30 and 35 per cent over the ﬁve-year period
from 2004/05 to 2008/09 (see ORR, 2003). At the overall level, the
ORR’s conclusions mean that total infrastructure cash costs will fall by
36 per cent over the period.
While these savings are signiﬁcant, it should be noted that they start
from a 2003/04 infrastructure cost base which is some 27 per cent higher
(unit costs 24 per cent higher) than in 2001/02, the last year covered by
the analysis in this paper. As a result, even if Network Rail delivers on
the targets set by the ORR, unit infrastructure costs — that is, infrastruc-
ture costs per train kilometre — will not fall below 2001/02 levels until
2006/07 (assuming constant traﬃc levels). On this basis, unit infrastructure
costs in 2008/09 are projected to be roughly 20 per cent below 2001/02
levels, but still 16 per cent higher than in the last year before Hatﬁeld
(1999/00). Furthermore, Table 4 shows that a large proportion of recent
industry cost can be attributed to train operating costs. This ﬁnding there-
fore suggests that attention to cost trends is required across the whole
industry — and not just infrastructure.
5.3 Quality, safety and productivity
Three measures have been selected for analysis, based on long-term data
availability: train performance; broken rails (per train km); and passenger
fatalities (per passenger km). Train performance represents a measure of
output quality, while the other two are indirect or direct measures of
safety (broken rails and passenger fatalities respectively). The train
performance variable is a composite of the punctuality and reliability
data published by British Rail and the SRA.64 The other measures do
64Punctuality measures the proportion of trains running on time, while reliability reﬂects the proportion
of trains that are cancelled. See Section 4 and Appendix 2 for further details. See below for further
discussion of the impact of changes in deﬁnition on the data.
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not require further explanation. The data is summarised in Table 8.65 To
our knowledge, such a long-term series for two of the three measures
(train performance and broken rails) has not previously been reported in
the literature.
As noted in the introduction to this section, attempts to incorporate
these measures directly into the total cost function did not produce sensible
results, even when lagged relationships between the variables were
explored.66 As a result, the main analysis here is based on simple observa-
tion of the cost/quality/safety data over time. In addition, econometric
estimation is conducted in order to explore the determinants of these key
quality/safety variables over the period. The train performance and
safety measures are discussed in turn below.
5.3.1 Train performance
The full time series for train performance is shown in Figure 3, covering the
period for which data are available (1975 to 2001/02). It should be noted
that the sharp increase in the train performance measure in 1996/97 does
not result from deﬁnitional changes (the deﬁnitions were changed one
Table 8
Quality/Safety Measures
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Pre-sale
1990s
Post-sale
Pre-HAT a
1990s
Post-sale
Post-HAT
Train performance (per cent) NA 89.4 87.9 87.7 91.0 81.5
Broken rails per train km
(Index: 1969¼ 100)
100 118.4 116.5 102.4 116.7 79.5
Passenger fatalities per pass. km
(Index: 1963¼ 100)
101.4 91.3 79.4 57.6 49.2 26.0
aHAT ¼Hatﬁeld.
Train performance data from 1975.
Broken rails data available from 1969.
Sources: see Section 4 and Appendix 2.
65Note that the last year before privatisation in Table 8 is taken to be 1995/96— that is, before Railtrack
and the train operators were privatised. In previous tables in this paper, the last year under British Rail
is taken to be 1992/93, as some restructuring and sell-oﬀs started from 1993/94.
66This may be the result of collinearity problems, the relatively small sample size and endogeneity
problems (that is, the quality/safety measures might be considered as endogenous variables — and
therefore, inclusion of these variables on the right hand side of a cost regression may introduce
bias).
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year earlier in 1995/96).67 This increase represents a genuine improvement,
driven largely by reductions in Railtrack-caused delays (see Pollitt and
Smith, 2002). Railtrack was given very strong incentives to improve
performance under the incentive regimes put in place at the time of
privatisation. Of course, the deterioration in post-Hatﬁeld train perfor-
mance likewise represents a genuine deterioration and is not driven by
deﬁnition changes.68
With the deﬁnitional points dealt with, it is clear from Figure 3 and from
Table 8 that improvements in train performance cannot be used to explain
higher costs/lower productivity in the post-Hatﬁeld environment. While
costs have surged during the post-Hatﬁeld period, train performance
deteriorated sharply in 2000/01 and again in 2001/02, and has failed to
mount a signiﬁcant recovery since then. Furthermore, current performance
levels are now lower than at any previous period in the sample.
67From 1995/96, the punctuality deﬁnition changed, so that trains were deﬁned as late if more than 4.59
late (and 9.59 for InterCity), rather than 5.59 (and 10.59 for InterCity) as before. However, this change
does not appear to have a major impact on the data. Note also that the 1995/96 change actually made
it harder for trains to be counted as on-time. There was also a change in deﬁnition in 1992/93, with
data based on services covering Monday to Sunday, rather than Monday to Saturday as previously.
However, this change does not appear to have impacted signiﬁcantly on the data, with the composite
performance measure continuing an upward trend established in earlier years.
68As noted in Section 4 and Appendix 2, the change in deﬁnition of services covered by the PPM —
which would otherwise aﬀect the comparison after 1999/00 — has been corrected for.
Figure 3
Train Performancea
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There is little else that can be added regarding the cost-quality relation-
ship. However, is there more that can be said about the reasons behind the
recent sharp deterioration in train performance, based on the historical
data? Two possible explanations are explored here. First of all, it is clear
that track renewal activity over the post-Hatﬁeld period has been at very
high levels compared with the period immediately prior to Hatﬁeld. The
disruption caused by increased work on the track may be a driver of
recent performance falls. Second, traﬃc density (measured as passenger
train kilometres per track kilometre) was also higher in 2001/02 than at
any point during the period 1975 to 2001/02, and this factor would again
be expected to impact negatively on train performance.
Table 9 presents the results of regressing train performance on both
traﬃc density and track renewals per track kilometre (all in logs). The
results for Model A show that the coeﬃcients on the density and track
renewals variables take the expected negative signs, and that these variables
are also statistically signiﬁcant.69 However, Model B shows that these
eﬀects cease to be signiﬁcant once a Hatﬁeld dummy variable is included.
Overall, the econometric results therefore suggest that recent performance
falls are dominated by unexplained Hatﬁeld eﬀects, and that changes in
traﬃc density and track renewal volumes do not have a statistically signiﬁ-
cant impact on performance when modelled alongside a Hatﬁeld dummy
variable.
Of course, as discussed further below, the recent deterioration in train
performance may have been caused, in part, by a shift in the industry’s
priorities in favour of asset condition and safety measures, at the expense
of keeping the trains running on time. In this regard it should be noted
Table 9
Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable: Ln(Train Performance)
Model A Model B
Coeﬃcient t ratio Coeﬃcient t ratio
Constant 0.342 2.503 0.185 0.756
Ln(Passenger train km per track km) 0.157 3.134 0.023 0.266
Ln(Track Renewals per track km) 0.036 2.877 0.004 0.218
Hatﬁeld eﬀect dummy variablea 0.093 2.491
R2 statistic 0.346 0.485
aTakes the value unity in 2000/01 and 2001/02; zero elsewhere, since the main deterioration in
performance took place in 2000/01.
69The results in Table 9 are based on a log-linear model. The linear equivalent gives similar results.
Are Britain’s Railways Costing Too Much? Smith
31
that the number of temporary speed restrictions on the network has
remained high throughout the post-Hatﬁeld period, relative to previous
years (averaging 537 in 2002/03, compared with between 250 and 300
during the early years after privatisation).70
5.3.2 Safety measures
While post-Hatﬁeld cost increases cannot be justiﬁed based on train perfor-
mance data, which has deteriorated, the analysis now turns to consider
whether the recent cost rises can be explained by improvements in rail
safety? One measure of rail safety is the number of broken rails. Over the
last thirty or so years this measure has ﬂuctuated around an average of
roughly 740 per year (see Figure 4). However, in 1998/99 and 1999/00,
broken rails started to rise considerably, and this increase prompted the
ORR to set new targets for Railtrack. The Hatﬁeld accident — itself
caused by a broken rail — further heightened concerns over the condition
of the network, and the number of broken rails subsequently improved
sharply over the next two years, with further improvements continuing
under Network Rail.
The reduction in the number of broken rails was achieved alongside
improvements in other asset condition measures (for example, track
Figure 4
Number of Broken Rails and Broken Rails per Train Kilometre (Index: 1969¼ 100)
70See Booz-Allen & Hamilton (1999) and Network Rail (2003).
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 40, Part 1
32
geometry). The data therefore do appear to suggest a link between
improved asset condition and increased cost over the post-Hatﬁeld
period. The number of broken rails has now been reduced way below the
long-term average. Indeed, the econometric results presented in Table
1071 suggest that there is a clear, negative Hatﬁeld eﬀect on the number
of broken rails (although broken rails had started to fall prior to Hatﬁeld
— see Figure 4).
It should be noted that broken rails and other asset condition measures
are indirect measures of rail safety. Improvements in the quality of track
should, over time, be reﬂected in reduced numbers of accidents and fatal-
ities. However, the historical data show that few serious rail accidents in
Britain have been caused by rail breaks. As a result, the reduction in
broken rails seen in recent years may not have achieved much in terms of
reduced accident risk, although it may have improved perceptions about
safety on the railways. Of course, improved asset condition may be
desirable in its own right, apart from its impact on safety, although it is
questionable whether the recent improvements — so far in excess of
long-term average levels — are really required.
Before turning to look at actual data on passenger fatalities, it is
informative to consider an alternative indicator of accident risk on Britain’s
railways — namely SPADs (signals passed at danger). Although it has not
been possible to obtain comparable data over the longer-term, recent
trends suggest that this measure has also improved substantially in recent
years. SPADs per train kilometre fell by 55 per cent between 1994/95 and
2001/02, with the majority of this improvement achieved over the period
1998/99 to 2001/02. Here again, the data suggest a link between increased
Table 10
Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable: Ln(Broken Rails per Track Kilometre)
Coeﬃcient t ratio
Constant 0.191 0.468
Ln(Passenger train density)a 0.484 2.456
Ln(Freight tonne density)a 0.221 1.194
Hatﬁeld eﬀect dummy variableb 0.425 3.086
R2 statistic 0.265
aExpressed per track km.
bTakes the value 0.5 in 2000/01 and unity in 2001/02, as in the cost function
estimation described above.
71The results in Table 10 are based on a log-linear model. The linear model produces similar results.
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spending and reduced accident risk, as the recent improvements reﬂect, in
part, substantial investment in TPWS (the Train Protection and Warning
System);72 although it should be noted that SPADs were falling prior to
the installation of TPWS.
Figure 5 charts the number of passenger fatalities per passenger kilo-
metre over the period 1963 to 2001/02. The data show that the number
of passenger fatalities (in absolute terms, and per passenger kilometre)
has declined since the Hatﬁeld accident. It is therefore possible that the
recent attention to safety and asset condition measures, and the associated
increase in expenditure, may already have led to reduced numbers of
passenger fatalities — although it is too early to draw ﬁrm conclusions
based on just two years’ data. Econometric analysis of the determinants
of passenger fatalities produced little of interest in this regard.73 Of
course, Evans (2000 and 2002) has separately argued that, based on
the data available so far, the reduction in fatal train accidents since
Figure 5
Passenger Fatalities per Passenger Kilometre (Index: 1963¼ 100)
72This was fully implemented by the end of 2003, as required by the 1999 Railway Safety Regulations.
73Given the sharp annual ﬂuctuations in passenger fatality data, the econometric work was carried out
based on ﬁve year moving average data, thus precluding analysis of Hatﬁeld eﬀects, which relate only
to two years. The results suggested that variations in passenger fatalities over this period have been
dominated by time trend eﬀects, as Evans (2000 and 2002) also suggests.
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privatisation (and extending beyond Hatﬁeld) should be viewed as a
continuation of a long-term downward trend in accidents.74
To sum up, the above data and discussion suggest that the sharp cost
increases observed during the post-Hatﬁeld period have been associated
with improved safety on Britain’s railways. Broken rails fell sharply
between 1999/00 and 2001/02, and the econometric results show that this
can clearly be identiﬁed as a Hatﬁeld eﬀect (see Table 10; although some
progress in bringing broken rails down was being made prior to Hatﬁeld
as noted above). Meanwhile SPADs have fallen substantially, driven, in
part, by the rolling out of TPWS across the network. Finally, the number
of passenger fatalities has also fallen, although more data are required to
determine whether this represents a Hatﬁeld eﬀect, or merely a continua-
tion of previous long-term trends.
Of course, if recent cost increases have indeed led to improvements in
rail safety, it is important to ask whether these safety improvements are
worth it from a cost-beneﬁt perspective. The analysis now turns to consider
this question.
5.3.3 Cost–beneﬁt analysis of post-Hatﬁeld safety gains
In order to compute the beneﬁts of any safety improvements resulting from
Hatﬁeld, some measure of the associated reduction in passenger fatalities is
needed. One option would be to base the calculation on the reduction in
passenger fatalities between 1999/00 and 2001/02. However, such a calcula-
tion would be distorted by peaks in the data caused by individual incidents
(for example, the Ladbroke Grove disaster in 1999/00, in which 31 people
died). Table 11 therefore considers two comparisons.
First, the average number of fatalities over the post-Hatﬁeld years
(2000/01 and 2001/02) is compared with the average over the previous
ten years (1990/91 to 1999/00). This reduction in fatalities is translated
into a value to society using the VPF75 ﬁgures published by the Rail
Safety and Standards Board (RSSB). The RSSB puts the value of a rail
fatality (or multiple fatalities) at £3.35m per equivalent fatality.76 Of
course this comparison suﬀers from the problem that it is based on only
two years of post-Hatﬁeld data. To supplement the ﬁrst calculation,
Table 11 therefore also shows the value to society of eliminating passenger
74Although Evans does note a possible increase in the number of fatalities per accident in recent years.
Evans argues that it is reasonable to put this increase down to chance, until further data becomes
available. It may also reﬂect increased numbers of passengers per train, as train crowding has
worsened in recent years.
75Value of preventing a fatality.
76See Railway Group Safety Plan 2001/02, published by Railway Safety.
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fatalities altogether, based on the average number of fatalities over the ten
years from 1990/91 to 1999/00.
Table 11 shows that the social welfare beneﬁt of the post-Hatﬁeld reduc-
tion in passenger fatalities (£42m) is dwarfed by the Hatﬁeld eﬀect on
industry costs (£2.1bn),77 with the data implying a cost per life saved of
approximately £168m. Furthermore, even if passenger fatalities were cut
to zero, the resulting improvement in social welfare (£94m) would still be
well short of the £2.1bn increase in cost. The data in Table 11 therefore sug-
gest that if recent cost increases have been driven predominantly by safety
improvements — rather than straightforward reductions in productivity —
the cost of these improvements far outweighs the beneﬁts. It also implies
that the extra money being pumped into railways would be better spent
on road safety improvements, or possibly other areas of the public
sector, such as the National Health Service (NHS).
To complete this section, it should also be noted that the preceding
discussion highlights the stark contrast between performance and safety
trends in the post-Hatﬁeld era. It could be argued that the regulatory,
political, and legal environment in which the railways currently operate
has created a culture of risk aversion that produces ‘too much’ safety, at
the expense of performance. Rail accidents make headline news and
senior executives face lengthy follow-up enquiries, as well as the threat of
manslaughter charges, which may have a greater impact on management
incentives than the ﬁnancial payments underpinning the performance
Table 11
Societal Value of Reducing Passenger Fatalitiesa
Base data
Average annual number of passenger fatalities: 1990/91 to 1999/00 (pre-Hatﬁeld) 28.0
Average annual number of passenger fatalities: 2000/01 to 2001/02 (post-Hatﬁeld) 15.5
Societal values of reducing passenger fatalities (2001/02 prices)
Post-Hatﬁeld reduction in annual fatalities (28 per year to 15.5 per year) £42m
Reducing annual fatalities to zero (28 per year to zero per year) £94m
Costs
Hatﬁeld eﬀect on annual industry cash costs £2,122mb
aBased on a value of preventing a fatality (VPF) of £3.35m per equivalent fatality (multiple or rail
fatality).
bBased on applying the Hatﬁeld eﬀect (Model 2) of 34% to the cost base in 1999/00 (see Table 4).
77See note (b) to Table 11. This ﬁgure is lower than the £2.9bn increase in costs shown in Table 4, since
part of the cost rises are explained by the variables in the cost function regression analysis presented in
section 5.2 above (such as traﬃc growth).
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regimes — particularly following the loss of Railtrack equity incentives
after October 2001.78
A key question facing policy makers is whether there is a case for
refocusing eﬀort and resources away from safety towards dealing with per-
formance issues, and if so, how the framework of incentives should be set to
encourage delivery of this change in priorities. Of course, since improved
rail performance would have the eﬀect of taking passengers oﬀ the roads
— which are less safe — such a change in policy should actually reduce
fatalities on the two modes overall (although this eﬀect might be oﬀset,
to some extent, by the diversion of traﬃc to the even safer mode of air
transport).
6.0 Conclusions
The privatisation of British Rail has been the source of much controversy
over the eight years of private sector ownership, particularly after the sharp
increase in costs following the Hatﬁeld accident. The objective of this paper
was to construct total rail industry costs over the post-privatisation period,
and then assess post-Hatﬁeld cost and productivity levels against the histor-
ical precedents set by British Rail and also the early experience of the newly
privatised industry (1963 to date). Rail industry productivity levels and
trends for the post-Hatﬁeld period have not previously been reported in
the literature.
The paper reports a number of interesting ﬁndings. First of all, the data
show that annual industry cash costs have risen by £2.9bn in real terms since
the Hatﬁeld accident, an increase of 47 per cent (or a unit cost rise of 40 per
cent). Perhapsmore surprisingly, the data also show that TOC costs account
for 38 per cent of the total industry cost rise since Hatﬁeld, of which about
half comes from increases in the basic cost of running passenger train
services. Taken together, passenger and freight operator costs account for
42 per cent of the industry cost rise over the post-Hatﬁeld period.
The econometric results show that the sharp cost rises following the
Hatﬁeld accident are unprecedented when compared against historical
benchmarks. While railway costs are clearly inﬂuenced by the investment
cycle, including periods of under-investment, the results show that costs
have risen much more steeply over the post-Hatﬁeld period than during
previous investment peaks — including the track renewal boom in the
1970s. In terms of comparative productivity levels, the indices for the
78After the company was placed into administration.
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preferred models show that post-Hatﬁeld cost rises have more than wiped
out the TFP gains achieved over the previous four decades (though slightly
more favourable results are given by some of the other models). It is there-
fore not possible to justify post-Hatﬁeld cost and productivity levels by
reference to historical precedents, even when ﬂuctuations in the investment
cycle are taken into account.
Furthermore, preliminary data for 2002/03 and 2003/04 indicate that
industry costs have continued to rise sharply since the last year of the
sample used in the analysis (2001/02). In other words, the true picture of
post-Hatﬁeld cost and productivity performance may be even worse than
suggested by the results presented in this paper. However, a lack of external
benchmark information means that the industry’s regulators have so far
struggled to challenge these cost rises successfully.
The paper has also considered whether improvements in quality/safety
might be used to explain recent cost increases. Unfortunately, higher
costs after Hatﬁeld have not resulted in better train performance relative
to historic data — quite the reverse. On the other hand, it would appear
that the post-Hatﬁeld environment has been associated with improvements
in direct and indirect measures of rail safety. However, to the extent that
improved safety is the cause of higher railway costs, it is clear that the
implied investment in safety easily fails the cost–beneﬁt test. This ﬁnding
suggests that the current regulatory, legal and political environment may
have led to an excessive focus on safety, without due regard to cost consid-
erations or the implications for punctuality.
Of course, while safety considerations appear to have played a role in
driving up costs in recent years, there may be other factors impacting on
recent cost and productivity trends. The decision to place Railtrack into
administration, and replace it with a not-for-dividend company, may
have weakened incentives for cost control at a critical time for the industry.
Alternatively, part of the explanation may lie in higher maintenance and
renewal contractor proﬁts, although this is considered unlikely for the
reasons outlined earlier.79 On the train operation side, incentives to contain
costs may have been impacted by the franchise renewal process (delays and
changes in policy), as well as by the SRA’s approach to bailing out failing
TOCs. The impact of the new, more tightly-deﬁned franchise agreements
on TOC incentives remains to be seen. Further research is required in
this area.
79Even if contractor proﬁts have increased, driven perhaps by capacity constraints and insuﬃcient
competition between companies, the associated rise in Railtrack/Network Rail costs, and ultimately
government subsidies, is unlikely to represent good value for money for taxpayers. Note that in 2003,
Network Rail announced its decision to bring all maintenance activities in-house.
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Whatever the causes of the recent deterioration in rail productivity, the
results suggest that the industry should be able to achieve signiﬁcant pro-
ductivity gains in the future. While the ORR has tasked Network Rail
with achieving substantial eﬃciency savings over the period 2004/05 to
2008/09, these reductions start from an infrastructure cost base (2003/04)
that is 27 per cent higher than in 2001/02 (the last year covered by the ana-
lysis in this paper). This means that, even if Network Rail delivers on these
targets, infrastructure costs per train kilometre will not fall below 2001/02
levels until 2006/07; and the projections show that costs are not projected to
return to pre-Hatﬁeld levels over the period of Network Rail’s Business
Plan (to 2013/14).
It should also be noted that the ORR’s expenditure allowances have
been prepared on the assumption that Network Rail continues to improve
key asset condition and safety measures further. The level of infrastructure
cost savings could therefore be higher were this not the case. Furthermore,
given that the costs of train operation have also increased sharply post-
Hatﬁeld, it is clear that pressure needs to be brought to bear on costs
across the whole industry and not just infrastructure. It remains to be
seen what impact the current government review of the rail industry will
have on the industry’s priorities as between cost, safety and punctuality.
We suggest three key areas for future research. First, it is important to
obtain a greater understanding of the costs and beneﬁts of the safety
requirements and practices on Britain’s railways. This proposed work is
likely to require analysis at a considerably more disaggregated level than
has been attempted in the present discussion. Second, one of the key
issues facing policy makers is the fact that we still do not know where
Britain’s railways stand relative to international comparators. The develop-
ment of a robust international benchmarking framework should therefore
be a priority, particularly given the fact that overseas comparisons oﬀer
(potentially) the only way of justifying current cost levels. Finally, further
work is required to understand the reasons behind recent sharp increases
in train operating costs (as TOC costs have received considerably less atten-
tion than infrastructure costs in the recent rail policy debate).
Appendix 1
From 1978, the BR accounts show that capital grants received from the
government were reﬂected as revenue in the proﬁt and loss account
(P&L), with an equal and oﬀsetting charge reﬂected in costs (so that the
capital grant had a neutral impact on the P&L). The capital grant was
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then added to the capital reserve in the balance sheet. In the UIC accounts
the capital grant is (incorrectly) added to the depreciation charge, and the
UIC data therefore overstates the level of depreciation. From 1991/92, the
accounting policy changed, with the capital grant no longer shown in
turnover (only the revenue grant was included in turnover). Instead, the
capital grant was added to reserves in the balance sheet and then released
to the P&L as a negative cost over the lives of the assets. Once again the
UIC (incorrectly) includes this negative ﬁgure in the depreciation charge
for Britain and therefore understates the level of depreciation from 1991/
92 onwards.
Comparison of British Rail Depreciation Data:
BR Accounts vs. UIC
£m (current prices) 89/90 90/91 91/92 91/92
Re-stated
92/93 93/94
BR accounts
Depreciation charge 130 150 179 287 270 292
Capital grant charge to P&L 79 95 209 161 172 192
Sum of the above 209 245 388 126 98 100
UIC data
Depreciation charge 209 245 179 NA 98 100
Sources: BR Annual Report and Accounts; UIC International Railway Statistics.
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Appendix 2
Supplementary Information on Data Sources and Assumptions
Data Source Assumptions
Post-Hatﬁeld
cost adjustments
Annual reports of
privatised
companiesa (1996/97
to 2001/02); ATOC
Press Release
(February 2001);
SRA Annual Report
(2001/02).
As noted in Section 4, a number of adjustments
were made to the post-Hatﬁeld cost data to reﬂect
the large intra-industry payments over this period.
For some of these items, and for some TOCs, the
accounting treatment is not explicitly identiﬁed in
the relevant TOC accounts. In these cases
assumptions were made based on the practice of
other TOCs and also access charge revenue data
provided by Network Rail. Where not stated
explicitly in the TOC accounts, compensation
from Railtrack to TOCs is assumed to be included
in TOC accounts as a negative cost,b while TOC
penalty payments, Clause 18.1, and passenger
compensation are assumed to be included as
negative revenue. These assumptions were veriﬁed
following discussions with National Express
Group.
Section 4 also made reference to a ﬁgure of £590m
provided for in the Railtrack accounts in 2000/01,
in respect of compensation to train operators.
Note, however, that not all of the £590m was
actually paid. The amount actually paid is used in
the analysis here.
As part of the 2000 Periodic Review, track access
charges were reduced. Clause 18.1 of the TOC
Franchise Agreements mean that TOCs are held
neutral in respect of such changes, and therefore in
aggregate TOCs were required to make payments
to the SRA (Clause 18.1 payments referred to in
Section 4).
Volume and
quality measures
British Rail Annual
Reports; National
Rail Trends (SRA);
Transport Statistics
Great Britain;
Network Rail;
Health and Safety
Executive.
The composite train performance measure
referred to in Table 3 is calculated as punctuality
less (1-reliability). For the period after 1999/00 —
when punctuality and reliability reporting was
replaced by the SRA’s own combined measure
(the Public Performance Measure, or PPM) — the
composite measure used in this paper is
constructed based on the change in the SRA’s
PPMmeasure. This is possible because the PPM is
published alongside punctuality/reliability (1997/
98 to 1999/00).
aTOCs, EWS, Freightliner, three rolling stock companies and Railtrack/Network Rail.
bWith the exception of Charter compensation and compensation for disruption resulting from
large projects (e.g. West Coast Mainline), which is generally shown as other income in TOC
accounts.
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Appendix 3
Comparison with Results of Previous Studies
Annual average TFP growth rates (per cent)
Present study Previous studiesa
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Tornqvist Bishop and
Thompson (1992)
Cowie
(2002)
1970s 1.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 1.7 0.2
1980s 1.5 0.7 0.2 2.3 1.2 3.8
1970 to 1990 1.4 0.7 0.2 1.5 0.3 1.8
aNote that in the case of Cowie (2002), the 1970s TFP growth rate covers the period 1972 to 1980.
The results in the above table show some diﬀerences between the ﬁndings
reported in this paper and those reported for the previous studies shown
(these are the only studies from Tables 1 and 2 that explicitly report TFP
growth rates for comparable periods). However, as noted in Section 2,
the previous approaches shown above use track kilometres to represent
the capital input and are therefore not suited to addressing the problems
under consideration in this paper, which is concerned, inter alia, with
track investment and condition. Furthermore, it is not clear that these
studies have adequately dealt with the accounting problems discussed in
Section 2. In any case, neither of the studies shown above report (total
system) railway productivity measures beyond 1990, and therefore do not
shed light on questions concerning post-Hatﬁeld productivity levels.
In particular, it should be noted that the diﬀering results for the 1970s
are probably caused by the change in accounting policy in 1975, referred
to in Section 2. From 1975, track renewals were charged to the P&L
(previously they were capitalised). TFP measures based on labour inputs,
other costs and track mileage — as used in Bishop and Thompson (1992)
and Cowie (2002) — will therefore record this change as a deterioration
in TFP, since the rise in other costs will not be oﬀset by any change in
the capital input. However, the approach in this paper would not observe
any change in TFP, since the total cost measure used is invariant to changes
in accounting policy. As noted in Pollitt and Smith (2002), previous studies
may have overstated productivity growth during the 1980s due to the
substantial asset sales undertaken during that period.80
80See page 481.
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